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“Did specific U.S. operations in the Pacific War reflect a more Mahanian or Corbettian use of sea power by the United States?”
The professor will guide the discussion and make a determination as to whether or not the student has successfully demonstrated a sound comprehension and that the student has shown the ability to think strategically and critically about the dynamics of strategy and operations. Students who do not meet the standard as determined by the professor, will receive additional discussion questions until the professor determines that the student has validated the Competencies and Sub-Competencies established for that case study.
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Write My Essay For MeThis is an eight page requirement. Thesis, main argument, counterargument, rebuttal.
The Summative Assessment requirement for this module is an eight-page Capstone essay (8 pages or roughly 2,000 to 2,400 words exclusive of front matter such as the title page and foot or endnotes) in Times New Roman 12-pitch font, with 1-inch margins, type-written, double-spaced on an essay question assigned by the instructor. The essay must validate the Competency and Sub-Competencies for this Module.
Professors will use a randomly generated assignment of essay questions. At the start of the second week of the Module, professors will advise each student which essay question that they are assigned for that Module. Essays must be submitted by the student by the end of the final week of the Module.
Victory at Sea: prewar Planning, Military Transformation, Theater Command, and Joint Operations in a Major Maritime War – The Pacific War
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
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Module IV: Victory at Sea: Prewar Planning, Military Transformation, Theater Command, and Joint Operations in a Modern Maritime War – The Pacific War
A. Description
The Pacific War was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms that the United States Navy still relies on in our own era: surface combatants; aircraft carriers; and, submarines. Once Japan began to use kamikaze tactics with “human cruise missiles” at the end of the war, it foreshadowed naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The Pacific War also illuminated the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare, on which operational planners and strategic visionaries place much emphasis. Above all, it provided a lesson of enduring relevance as to the importance of Jointness. Notwithstanding conspicuous episodes of interService rivalry among American military leaders, the United States did better than Japan in integrating different forms of military power. Doing so contributed mightily to American operational effectiveness and strategic success in this greatest of all maritime wars.
Since the Pacific War, there has not been another maritime war between great naval powers. Many analysts doubt that there will be a future naval war that resembles the Pacific War. Yet the same general types of political aims and military concepts—for example, regional primacy, energy security, access denial, and strikes against adversaries’ military bases—that drove Japan into war with the United States have reemerged in China in the twenty-first century. Will the restraining factors of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence keep Chinese strategists in our era from taking the risks or making the major miscalculations that Japanese strategists did in the first half of the 1940s?
In every war studied in this course, we highlight certain operations in different geographic theatres or war-fighting domains and explore their overall strategic effects. The Pacific War case presents an extraordinarily rich menu in this regard for all phases of hostilities. There were initial surprise attacks in December 1941. Then there were pivotal operations and campaigns at Midway and in the Solomons in 1942 that enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific theater. In the second half of the war, an American combination of sequential and cumulative operations loomed ever larger. Finally, in the war termination phase of the summer of 1945, there was an American debate about decisive operations in the strategic sense of what courses of action would lead directly to Japan’s decision to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and only use of nuclear weapons in the history of warfare. Each type of operation that we highlight in this case study raises issues of enduring significance for students and practitioners of strategy and war in the twenty-first century.
Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of many Strategy and War case studies. In 1941 American political and military leaders, faced with uncertainty about where and when Japan might attack, failed to anticipate a carrier-aviation strike on Pearl Harbor, and United States Navy and Army commanders in Oahu failed to prepare an adequate Joint defense of their bases. The transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, to alter in 1941 the traditional thrust of Japanese naval planning for war against the United States. Yamamoto pushed a plan for preemptively attacking the Pacific Fleet rather than waiting to engage it in the Western Pacific. A good exercise in critical analysis for students is to evaluate the alternative courses of action open to Japan in terms of likely operational results and strategic effects. The fact that the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture—difficulties that Americans have experienced time and again since 1941. The fact that such surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan shows that it, too, had great cultural difficulties in understanding its adversary. Sun Tzuian concepts—deception, surprise, net assessment, and psychological effects—should cross students’ minds as they analyze the Pearl Harbor attack.
Japan did achieve extraordinary operational successes early in the Pacific War. In a noteworthy aberration in the normal pattern of bitter interService rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy, Japan’s military executed an exemplary series of Joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific from December 1941 to the spring of 1942. Strategically, never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time. The United States, with its prewar plans badly disrupted and its battleship force largely incapacitated, had to adapt to a radical change in its security environment and improvise responses to the Japanese onslaught. It did so under new naval leadership, with Admiral Chester Nimitz assuming command of the Pacific Fleet and with Admiral Ernest King becoming Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. King and Nimitz were able to lead the transition to transformed ways of waging maritime warfare, drawing upon remarkable developments, both technological and conceptual, in naval aviation, Marine amphibious operations, and submarine warfare.
Nimitz’s skill as a theater commander became evident at Midway, the first pivotal operation of 1942, when he confronted the most important strategic issue that a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan’s writings, which inspired Japanese naval doctrine at least as much as American naval doctrine, had highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet, but had not fully developed the operational issue of risk management. Students should seek to understand not only why both Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, but also how the two commanders managed that risk with different degrees of effectiveness. The way Nimitz put his trust in both his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.
The American victory at Midway made feasible a counteroffensive in the South Pacific that began later in the summer of 1942 and proved to be the second pivotal operation of the year. Here Admiral King played a key role as the primary proponent of contesting Japan’s decision to open a new theater in the Solomons, part of Tokyo’s strategic effort to cut the sea lines of communication between the United States and Australia. Despite the Europe First priority of Anglo-American strategy, President Roosevelt was willing to divert scarce military assets away from use against Germany in order to promote his general strategic concept of waging a war of attrition against Japan. The upshot was a Marine landing in August on the island of Guadalcanal—a remarkable example of improvisation. The ensuing campaign on and around Guadalcanal is an instructive example of successful joint operations with significant strategic effects. Success depended on the coordinated use of ground, air, and sea forces and was hard to achieve. Ships were sunk and aircraft were destroyed in great numbers. Japan could ill afford its disproportionate losses of key elements of its military power. In thinking about the operational character and strategic results of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign, students should recall the writings of Corbett concerning peripheral operations.
As President Roosevelt had anticipated, the attrition that the Japanese suffered at Midway and in the Solomons put them at an ever greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. The United States was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative operations. The cumulative economic effects of American submarine operations meant that Japan had great trouble in regenerating combat power to meet a two-pronged island-hopping American offensive across the Pacific. One prong, under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, jumped through the Southwest Pacific. The other prong, under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, with new fast carrier task forces, at-sea logistical replenishment, and Marine amphibious units, drove across the Central Pacific.
The Joint Maritime Operations Course examines the operational art of managing the convergence of the Central and Southwest Pacific prongs at Leyte Gulf in late 1944. The Strategy and War Course examines the operational and strategic risks and rewards of dividing American forces into separate prongs from late 1943 to late 1944. Students should think about the circumstances in which it makes sense to violate arguably the most basic war-fighting principle—“mass” (or “concentration,” as Clausewitz called it). Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war in which the United States and its allies had agreed that Germany was the primary enemy, students should also consider whether the assets that flowed to one of these two prongs in the Pacific might have been better used to obtain a greater war termination payoff in another theater.
As American forces developed bases in the Marianas in order to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited Japan. When American forces took Okinawa in June 1945, the Japanese Emperor began to exert, behind the scenes, his influence in favor of a negotiated settlement to end the war. But, the Japanese military leaders remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting great casualties on American forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the United States to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender.
Before the dropping of the atomic bombs in August 1945, the Emperor was unwilling to confront the military leaders on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the Emperor reigned but did not rule. The Japanese military leadership had long been able to defy or circumvent civilian authority. Within the American government, there was considerable debate about what operations would be decisive enough to generate Japanese surrender sooner rather than later. Had not the atomic bombs ended the war in August 1945, there would have been further interService conflict over the planned invasion of Kyushu in the fall of 1945. Given the ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over the necessity for the United States to use nuclear weapons. It should be noted that in the discussions of American political and military leaders at the time, no one expressed strong moral misgivings.
Despite the bitterness of the fighting in the Pacific War and despite the nuclear devastation at its end, the postwar American occupation of Japan did not meet with violent Japanese resistance. Japanese militarism was discredited in the eyes of the Japanese people. The American government had been wise enough to plan during the war for the postwar occupation. American leaders decided to allow the Emperor to remain on the throne. General MacArthur proved to be an effective Supreme Commander of occupied Japan. American occupation authorities found Japanese partners willing to participate in the establishment of a new democratic and demilitarized Japanese regime. The occupation gave way in the early 1950s during the Korean War, to an alliance between the United States and Japan that survived throughout the Cold War and thrives into the twenty-first century.
From the perspective not only of military operations during the Pacific War but also of long-term political relations after the war, this case study has a strong claim to stand out as the greatest American strategic success ever. But, from another perspective, the outcome of the Pacific War spelled trouble for the United States in the future. American war termination strategy and policy, focused as it was on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the different parts of the Japanese Empire on the mainland of East Asia. In Asia as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the war. While Europe immediately became the central theater of the Cold War, East Asia emerged as the most violent region in the world for more than thirty years with a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies. The Pacific War’s ending, then, did not bring peace to the region, but created a new set of geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that still remain active threatening to erupt in renewed conflict.
B. Points for Consideration
In each case study “Points for Consideration” are included to help structure study. An attempt to come to grips with these questions should be made while completing reading assignments as such questions form the basis of understanding of Strategy and War concepts.
1. What conclusions of operational and strategic significance would you derive from a net assessment of the United States and Japan on the eve of the Pacific War?
2. Who had done the better job of prewar preparation for the Pacific War — the United States or Japan?
3. Did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?
4. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?
5. Use your knowledge of Corbett to assess the operational character and strategic significance of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign.
6. Japan’s attack in December, 1941 against the British Empire and the United States is considered a classic case of deterrence failure. Why did the foreign policy and strategic steps taken by Britain and the United States fail to deter Japan?
7. Both Yamamoto and Nimitz risked their fleets at Midway in June 1942. Compare and evaluate how each of these two naval commanders addressed the issue of operational and strategic risk.
8. What role did strategic bombing play in defeating Japan? Evaluate the importance of this role.
9. Was the Guadalcanal Campaign decisive with respect to the outcome of the Pacific War? Evaluate the Joint cooperation of and contributions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to “turning the tide” against the Japanese in the Pacific.
10. How did Japanese strategic culture influence her decision to launch a surprise attack against the United States in 1941? To what extent did Japanese strategic planning reflect the realities of her military and geo-strategic position from 1931 through 1941, and, during the first year of the war with the United States?
11. Some contend that the Joint cooperation between General Douglas MacArthur and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey set a standard by which all future Joint operations should be judged in the future during their Upper Solomons campaign. Do you agree or disagree, and why?
12. Why did the United States adopt a multi-pronged strategy for its advance across the Pacific? Was it the most effective strategy available? To what extent did it give the Japanese exploitable strategic opportunities?
13. Suppose the United States either had not developed atomic weapons by 1945 or had chosen not to use them against Japan. Assess the likely operational effectiveness, strategic effects, and moral implications of other American options for terminating the Pacific War.
14. Before the war, American and Japanese naval planners expected that the outcome of a war between the two countries would be decided by major battles fought by surface ships. To what extent were these pre-war expectations borne out by the experience of the Pacific War?
15.Which operations of the Pacific War are the most important for military planners to learn lessons from in the twenty-first century?
16. While some contend that the Battle of Midway marked the point in World War II where the tide turned irrevocably against Japan, others cite the fight to maintain control of Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands as decisive in the outcome of the Pacific War. Which argument is correct?
17. How did the capabilities and limitations of American and Japanese naval forces impact on their successful ability to conduct war?
18. Evaluate Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher, Mark A. Mitscher, Raymond A. Spruance, William F. Halsey, Richmond Kelly Turner, and Chiuchi Nagumo as operational commanders. Consider their decisions during the major battles in which they held command.
C. Readings
1. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. pp. 703-32.
[James provides a policy and strategy overview of the Pacific War.]
2. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. pp. 119-189, 206-272.
[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy’s role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations against Japan from 1940 to 1945.]
3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517.
[Evans and Peattie address the IJN’s doctrinal and institutional deficiencies as revealed in the Pacific War.]
4. Marston, Daniel, ed. The Pacific War Companion . Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 2-4, 5, 9, 11, 13.
[This collection of essays, ranging from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 to the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, allows readers to focus on the key operations and operational leaders on both sides of the Pacific War. Students should take note that Professor Gatchel’s essay on pages 159-177 provides excellent background for the JMO Department’s case study on Leyte Gulf. Students should also note that the pivotal Midway naval engagement and Guadalcanal/Solomons joint operations of 1942 are covered in other readings.]
5. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway . Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59.
(Selected Reading)
[Parshall and Tully provide the Japanese side of the pivotal naval engagement at Midway in June, 1942, including a close analysis of Admiral Yamamoto’s operational plan.]
6. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded . New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-343.
(Selected Reading)
[Prados analyzes the role of American codebreakers deciphering Japanese operational messages and how this ability helped Admiral Nimitz to formulate his plan for Midway.]
7. Warner, Denis and Peggy. “The Doctrine of Surprise”; Miller, Edward S. “Kimmel’s Hidden Agenda”; and Cohen, Eliot A. “The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History , vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73.
(Selected Readings)
[In these three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Warners offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute, if his fleet had not been the victim of the surprise attack.]
8. Wylie, J.C. “Excerpt from ‘Reflections on the War in the Pacific,’” Appendix A in Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121.
(Selected Reading)
[Wylie distinguishes between “sequential” and “cumulative” operations and shows how both were important to the outcome of the Pacific War.]
9. Corbett, Sir Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. pp. 3-106.
[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of Joint and peripheral operations.]
10. Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought . Third, Revised and Expanded Edition. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-63, 135-154, and 215-254.
[Handel discusses three key strategic issues that were significant factors in the Pacific Theater – attacking the enemy’s strategy, decisive victory, and intelligence.]
11. Nimitz, Admiral C.W. “Operation Plan No. 29-42,” 27 May 1942, and “Letter of Instruction,” 28 May 1942.
(Selected Readings)
[Contrast the simplicity of Admiral Nimitz’s operation plan with the complexity of Yamamoto’s
and use Nimitz’ “Letter of Instruction” in considering how the two naval commanders handled
operational risk management.]
12. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific,” in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare . London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98.
(Selected Readings)
[Lee illuminates why the operations in and around Guadalcanal deserve to be highlighted in this case study. Note in particular the concept of a “pivotal campaign” and the relevance of Corbettian theory for a peripheral theater.]
13. Mahnken, Thomas. “Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942-1943.” Naval War College Review , vol. 64, no. 12 (Winter 2011): 95-121.
(Selected Readings)
[Mahnken offers insight into the naval battles off Guadalcanal.]
14. Rosen, Stephen Peter . Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147.
(Selected Readings)
[Rosen emphasizes the major adaptations that the U.S. submarine force made in order to be operationally effective in the Pacific War, and the strategic effects of submarine operations against Japanese shipping and war economy.]
“Did specific U.S. operations in the Pacific War reflect a more Mahanian or Corbettian use of sea power by the United States?”
The professor will guide the discussion and make a determination as to whether or not the student has successfully demonstrated a sound comprehension and that the student has shown the ability to think strategically and critically about the dynamics of strategy and operations. Students who do not meet the standard as determined by the professor, will receive additional discussion questions until the professor determines that the student has validated the Competencies and Sub-Competencies established for that case study.
This is an eight page requirement. Thesis, main argument, counterargument, rebuttal.
The Summative Assessment requirement for this module is an eight-page Capstone essay (8 pages or roughly 2,000 to 2,400 words exclusive of front matter such as the title page and foot or endnotes) in Times New Roman 12-pitch font, with 1-inch margins, type-written, double-spaced on an essay question assigned by the instructor. The essay must validate the Competency and Sub-Competencies for this Module.
Professors will use a randomly generated assignment of essay questions. At the start of the second week of the Module, professors will advise each student which essay question that they are assigned for that Module. Essays must be submitted by the student by the end of the final week of the Module.
Victory at Sea: prewar Planning, Military Transformation, Theater Command, and Joint Operations in a Major Maritime War – The Pacific War
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
·
Module IV: Victory at Sea: Prewar Planning, Military Transformation, Theater Command, and Joint Operations in a Modern Maritime War – The Pacific War
A. Description
The Pacific War was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms that the United States Navy still relies on in our own era: surface combatants; aircraft carriers; and, submarines. Once Japan began to use kamikaze tactics with “human cruise missiles” at the end of the war, it foreshadowed naval warfare in the age of precision strike. The Pacific War also illuminated the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare, on which operational planners and strategic visionaries place much emphasis. Above all, it provided a lesson of enduring relevance as to the importance of Jointness. Notwithstanding conspicuous episodes of interService rivalry among American military leaders, the United States did better than Japan in integrating different forms of military power. Doing so contributed mightily to American operational effectiveness and strategic success in this greatest of all maritime wars.
Since the Pacific War, there has not been another maritime war between great naval powers. Many analysts doubt that there will be a future naval war that resembles the Pacific War. Yet the same general types of political aims and military concepts—for example, regional primacy, energy security, access denial, and strikes against adversaries’ military bases—that drove Japan into war with the United States have reemerged in China in the twenty-first century. Will the restraining factors of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence keep Chinese strategists in our era from taking the risks or making the major miscalculations that Japanese strategists did in the first half of the 1940s?
In every war studied in this course, we highlight certain operations in different geographic theatres or war-fighting domains and explore their overall strategic effects. The Pacific War case presents an extraordinarily rich menu in this regard for all phases of hostilities. There were initial surprise attacks in December 1941. Then there were pivotal operations and campaigns at Midway and in the Solomons in 1942 that enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific theater. In the second half of the war, an American combination of sequential and cumulative operations loomed ever larger. Finally, in the war termination phase of the summer of 1945, there was an American debate about decisive operations in the strategic sense of what courses of action would lead directly to Japan’s decision to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and only use of nuclear weapons in the history of warfare. Each type of operation that we highlight in this case study raises issues of enduring significance for students and practitioners of strategy and war in the twenty-first century.
Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of many Strategy and War case studies. In 1941 American political and military leaders, faced with uncertainty about where and when Japan might attack, failed to anticipate a carrier-aviation strike on Pearl Harbor, and United States Navy and Army commanders in Oahu failed to prepare an adequate Joint defense of their bases. The transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, to alter in 1941 the traditional thrust of Japanese naval planning for war against the United States. Yamamoto pushed a plan for preemptively attacking the Pacific Fleet rather than waiting to engage it in the Western Pacific. A good exercise in critical analysis for students is to evaluate the alternative courses of action open to Japan in terms of likely operational results and strategic effects. The fact that the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture—difficulties that Americans have experienced time and again since 1941. The fact that such surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan shows that it, too, had great cultural difficulties in understanding its adversary. Sun Tzuian concepts—deception, surprise, net assessment, and psychological effects—should cross students’ minds as they analyze the Pearl Harbor attack.
Japan did achieve extraordinary operational successes early in the Pacific War. In a noteworthy aberration in the normal pattern of bitter interService rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy, Japan’s military executed an exemplary series of Joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific from December 1941 to the spring of 1942. Strategically, never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time. The United States, with its prewar plans badly disrupted and its battleship force largely incapacitated, had to adapt to a radical change in its security environment and improvise responses to the Japanese onslaught. It did so under new naval leadership, with Admiral Chester Nimitz assuming command of the Pacific Fleet and with Admiral Ernest King becoming Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. King and Nimitz were able to lead the transition to transformed ways of waging maritime warfare, drawing upon remarkable developments, both technological and conceptual, in naval aviation, Marine amphibious operations, and submarine warfare.
Nimitz’s skill as a theater commander became evident at Midway, the first pivotal operation of 1942, when he confronted the most important strategic issue that a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan’s writings, which inspired Japanese naval doctrine at least as much as American naval doctrine, had highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet, but had not fully developed the operational issue of risk management. Students should seek to understand not only why both Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, but also how the two commanders managed that risk with different degrees of effectiveness. The way Nimitz put his trust in both his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.
The American victory at Midway made feasible a counteroffensive in the South Pacific that began later in the summer of 1942 and proved to be the second pivotal operation of the year. Here Admiral King played a key role as the primary proponent of contesting Japan’s decision to open a new theater in the Solomons, part of Tokyo’s strategic effort to cut the sea lines of communication between the United States and Australia. Despite the Europe First priority of Anglo-American strategy, President Roosevelt was willing to divert scarce military assets away from use against Germany in order to promote his general strategic concept of waging a war of attrition against Japan. The upshot was a Marine landing in August on the island of Guadalcanal—a remarkable example of improvisation. The ensuing campaign on and around Guadalcanal is an instructive example of successful joint operations with significant strategic effects. Success depended on the coordinated use of ground, air, and sea forces and was hard to achieve. Ships were sunk and aircraft were destroyed in great numbers. Japan could ill afford its disproportionate losses of key elements of its military power. In thinking about the operational character and strategic results of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign, students should recall the writings of Corbett concerning peripheral operations.
As President Roosevelt had anticipated, the attrition that the Japanese suffered at Midway and in the Solomons put them at an ever greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. The United States was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative operations. The cumulative economic effects of American submarine operations meant that Japan had great trouble in regenerating combat power to meet a two-pronged island-hopping American offensive across the Pacific. One prong, under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, jumped through the Southwest Pacific. The other prong, under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, with new fast carrier task forces, at-sea logistical replenishment, and Marine amphibious units, drove across the Central Pacific.
The Joint Maritime Operations Course examines the operational art of managing the convergence of the Central and Southwest Pacific prongs at Leyte Gulf in late 1944. The Strategy and War Course examines the operational and strategic risks and rewards of dividing American forces into separate prongs from late 1943 to late 1944. Students should think about the circumstances in which it makes sense to violate arguably the most basic war-fighting principle—“mass” (or “concentration,” as Clausewitz called it). Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war in which the United States and its allies had agreed that Germany was the primary enemy, students should also consider whether the assets that flowed to one of these two prongs in the Pacific might have been better used to obtain a greater war termination payoff in another theater.
As American forces developed bases in the Marianas in order to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited Japan. When American forces took Okinawa in June 1945, the Japanese Emperor began to exert, behind the scenes, his influence in favor of a negotiated settlement to end the war. But, the Japanese military leaders remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting great casualties on American forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the United States to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender.
Before the dropping of the atomic bombs in August 1945, the Emperor was unwilling to confront the military leaders on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the Emperor reigned but did not rule. The Japanese military leadership had long been able to defy or circumvent civilian authority. Within the American government, there was considerable debate about what operations would be decisive enough to generate Japanese surrender sooner rather than later. Had not the atomic bombs ended the war in August 1945, there would have been further interService conflict over the planned invasion of Kyushu in the fall of 1945. Given the ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over the necessity for the United States to use nuclear weapons. It should be noted that in the discussions of American political and military leaders at the time, no one expressed strong moral misgivings.
Despite the bitterness of the fighting in the Pacific War and despite the nuclear devastation at its end, the postwar American occupation of Japan did not meet with violent Japanese resistance. Japanese militarism was discredited in the eyes of the Japanese people. The American government had been wise enough to plan during the war for the postwar occupation. American leaders decided to allow the Emperor to remain on the throne. General MacArthur proved to be an effective Supreme Commander of occupied Japan. American occupation authorities found Japanese partners willing to participate in the establishment of a new democratic and demilitarized Japanese regime. The occupation gave way in the early 1950s during the Korean War, to an alliance between the United States and Japan that survived throughout the Cold War and thrives into the twenty-first century.
From the perspective not only of military operations during the Pacific War but also of long-term political relations after the war, this case study has a strong claim to stand out as the greatest American strategic success ever. But, from another perspective, the outcome of the Pacific War spelled trouble for the United States in the future. American war termination strategy and policy, focused as it was on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the different parts of the Japanese Empire on the mainland of East Asia. In Asia as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the war. While Europe immediately became the central theater of the Cold War, East Asia emerged as the most violent region in the world for more than thirty years with a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies. The Pacific War’s ending, then, did not bring peace to the region, but created a new set of geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that still remain active threatening to erupt in renewed conflict.
B. Points for Consideration
In each case study “Points for Consideration” are included to help structure study. An attempt to come to grips with these questions should be made while completing reading assignments as such questions form the basis of understanding of Strategy and War concepts.
1. What conclusions of operational and strategic significance would you derive from a net assessment of the United States and Japan on the eve of the Pacific War?
2. Who had done the better job of prewar preparation for the Pacific War — the United States or Japan?
3. Did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?
4. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?
5. Use your knowledge of Corbett to assess the operational character and strategic significance of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign.
6. Japan’s attack in December, 1941 against the British Empire and the United States is considered a classic case of deterrence failure. Why did the foreign policy and strategic steps taken by Britain and the United States fail to deter Japan?
7. Both Yamamoto and Nimitz risked their fleets at Midway in June 1942. Compare and evaluate how each of these two naval commanders addressed the issue of operational and strategic risk.
8. What role did strategic bombing play in defeating Japan? Evaluate the importance of this role.
9. Was the Guadalcanal Campaign decisive with respect to the outcome of the Pacific War? Evaluate the Joint cooperation of and contributions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to “turning the tide” against the Japanese in the Pacific.
10. How did Japanese strategic culture influence her decision to launch a surprise attack against the United States in 1941? To what extent did Japanese strategic planning reflect the realities of her military and geo-strategic position from 1931 through 1941, and, during the first year of the war with the United States?
11. Some contend that the Joint cooperation between General Douglas MacArthur and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey set a standard by which all future Joint operations should be judged in the future during their Upper Solomons campaign. Do you agree or disagree, and why?
12. Why did the United States adopt a multi-pronged strategy for its advance across the Pacific? Was it the most effective strategy available? To what extent did it give the Japanese exploitable strategic opportunities?
13. Suppose the United States either had not developed atomic weapons by 1945 or had chosen not to use them against Japan. Assess the likely operational effectiveness, strategic effects, and moral implications of other American options for terminating the Pacific War.
14. Before the war, American and Japanese naval planners expected that the outcome of a war between the two countries would be decided by major battles fought by surface ships. To what extent were these pre-war expectations borne out by the experience of the Pacific War?
15.Which operations of the Pacific War are the most important for military planners to learn lessons from in the twenty-first century?
16. While some contend that the Battle of Midway marked the point in World War II where the tide turned irrevocably against Japan, others cite the fight to maintain control of Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands as decisive in the outcome of the Pacific War. Which argument is correct?
17. How did the capabilities and limitations of American and Japanese naval forces impact on their successful ability to conduct war?
18. Evaluate Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher, Mark A. Mitscher, Raymond A. Spruance, William F. Halsey, Richmond Kelly Turner, and Chiuchi Nagumo as operational commanders. Consider their decisions during the major battles in which they held command.
C. Readings
1. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. pp. 703-32.
[James provides a policy and strategy overview of the Pacific War.]
2. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. pp. 119-189, 206-272.
[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy’s role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations against Japan from 1940 to 1945.]
3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517.
[Evans and Peattie address the IJN’s doctrinal and institutional deficiencies as revealed in the Pacific War.]
4. Marston, Daniel, ed. The Pacific War Companion . Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 2-4, 5, 9, 11, 13.
[This collection of essays, ranging from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 to the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, allows readers to focus on the key operations and operational leaders on both sides of the Pacific War. Students should take note that Professor Gatchel’s essay on pages 159-177 provides excellent background for the JMO Department’s case study on Leyte Gulf. Students should also note that the pivotal Midway naval engagement and Guadalcanal/Solomons joint operations of 1942 are covered in other readings.]
5. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway . Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59.
(Selected Reading)
[Parshall and Tully provide the Japanese side of the pivotal naval engagement at Midway in June, 1942, including a close analysis of Admiral Yamamoto’s operational plan.]
6. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded . New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-343.
(Selected Reading)
[Prados analyzes the role of American codebreakers deciphering Japanese operational messages and how this ability helped Admiral Nimitz to formulate his plan for Midway.]
7. Warner, Denis and Peggy. “The Doctrine of Surprise”; Miller, Edward S. “Kimmel’s Hidden Agenda”; and Cohen, Eliot A. “The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History , vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73.
(Selected Readings)
[In these three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Warners offer an explanation of the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute, if his fleet had not been the victim of the surprise attack.]
8. Wylie, J.C. “Excerpt from ‘Reflections on the War in the Pacific,’” Appendix A in Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121.
(Selected Reading)
[Wylie distinguishes between “sequential” and “cumulative” operations and shows how both were important to the outcome of the Pacific War.]
9. Corbett, Sir Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. pp. 3-106.
[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of Joint and peripheral operations.]
10. Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought . Third, Revised and Expanded Edition. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-63, 135-154, and 215-254.
[Handel discusses three key strategic issues that were significant factors in the Pacific Theater – attacking the enemy’s strategy, decisive victory, and intelligence.]
11. Nimitz, Admiral C.W. “Operation Plan No. 29-42,” 27 May 1942, and “Letter of Instruction,” 28 May 1942.
(Selected Readings)
[Contrast the simplicity of Admiral Nimitz’s operation plan with the complexity of Yamamoto’s
and use Nimitz’ “Letter of Instruction” in considering how the two naval commanders handled
operational risk management.]
12. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific,” in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare . London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98.
(Selected Readings)
[Lee illuminates why the operations in and around Guadalcanal deserve to be highlighted in this case study. Note in particular the concept of a “pivotal campaign” and the relevance of Corbettian theory for a peripheral theater.]
13. Mahnken, Thomas. “Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942-1943.” Naval War College Review , vol. 64, no. 12 (Winter 2011): 95-121.
(Selected Readings)
[Mahnken offers insight into the naval battles off Guadalcanal.]
14. Rosen, Stephen Peter . Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147.
(Selected Readings)
[Rosen emphasizes the major adaptations that the U.S. submarine force made in order to be operationally effective in the Pacific War, and the strategic effects of submarine operations against Japanese shipping and war economy.]
